In 2 experiments, rats received discrimination training in which separate presentations of A and B signaled a common pair of relationships or associations (X ---, food and Y --. no food), whereas presentations of C and D signaled a different pair of relationships (X ~ no food and Y ---* food). To assess the nature of the associative structures acquired during this training, rats then received 2 types of revaluation procedure: In Experiment 1, A was paired with shock and C was not. In Experiment 2, the relationships that A and B had previously signaled (X --, food and Y--~ no food) were paired with shock, whereas those that C and D had signaled (Y ~ food and X ~ no food) were not. After both types of revaluation treatment, rats showed greater generalized conditioned suppression in the presence of B than D. These results indicate that A, B, C, and D come to evoke memories of the relationships or associations that they have signaled.
Animals can acquire discriminations in which the presence or absence of any single conditioned stimulus (CS) provides no information regarding whether or not an unconditioned stimulus (US) will be delivered. For example, in a biconditional discrimination, the presentation of some combinations of CSs (A-X and B-Y) signal that a US will be delivered, whereas that of others (A-Y and B-X) signal that no US will be delivered (see, e.g., Asratyan, 1961 Asratyan, , 1965 Good & Honey, 1991; Kimmel & Ray, 1978; Preston, Dickinson, & Mackintosh, 1986; Saavedra, 1975; Wilson & Pearce, 1989) . Accounts of the way in which animals acquire such discriminations fall into two classes: configural and conditional.
Configural accounts suppose that the combination of two stimuli gives rise to a unique or configural representation that enters into an association with a representation of the outcome of a particular trial (the presence or absence of the US; see, e.g., Pearce, 1987 Pearce, , 1994 Rescorla, 1972) . According to such accounts, acquisition of a biconditional discrimination involves the formation of associative links between (a) configural representations of the stimuli presented on reinforced trials (AX and BY) and the US representation and (b) configural representations of the stimuli presented on nonreinforced trials (AY and BX) and a representation of the absence of the US.
In contrast, conditional, or occasion-setting, accounts suppose that the acquisition of a biconditional discrimina-R. C. Honey and Andrew Watt, School of Psychology, University of Wales, Cardiff, United Kingdom.
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Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to R. C. Honey, School of Psychology, University of Wales, Cardiff, Park Place, Cardiff CF1 3YG, United Kingdom. tion involves a hierarchical form of learning. Specifically, the association between representations of a given stimulus and a reinforcer is held to be gated or activated by another superordinate stimulus (Holland, 1983 ; see also Bonardi, 1989; Bouton, 1991; Rescorla, 1991) . According to this form of account, a biconditional task might be acquired by (a) A activating the X ~ US association and B activating the Y ~ US association or (b) B activating the X ~ no US association and A activating the Y no US association. Although these two general classes of account appear to be quite distinct, there is little direct evidence that allows one to discriminate between them (see Swartzentruber, 1995) . Here we evaluate these accounts using two novel procedures that are based on those used in studies of the acquired equivalence and distinctiveness of cues and sensory preconditioning (Brogden, 1939; Rizley & Rescorla, 1972) . Honey and Hall (1989) gave rats separate presentations of two stimuli, A and B, that were both paired with food and nonreinforced presentations of a third stimulus, C. Subsequently, A was paired with shock, and the level of generalized conditioned suppression to B and C was assessed. Generalization was more marked to B than to C. Honey and Hall's interpretation of the acquired-equivalence effect was simple: It was supposed that (a) initial training resulted in A and B activating a representation of food; (b) subsequent pairings of A with shock allowed the associatively activated representation of food to become linked to a representation of shock (see Holland, 1981; and also Ward-Robinson & Hall, 1996) ; and (c) B elicited suppression because it evoked a representation of shock through its capacity to activate a representation of food (see Hall, 1996 , for a review). This phenomenon suggests one means of assessing what is learned during biconditional discrimination training. Briefly, if one assumes that biconditional training results in stimuli coming to activate specific associations, then the degree of generalization between stimuli that activate the same association should be more marked than between stimuli that activate different associations. This experimental strategy was adopted in Experiment 1. Experiment 2 used a complementary strategy based on the phenomenon of sensory preconditioning.
Sensory preconditioning refers to the observation that, as a result of pairing two stimuli (e.g., A and X), changing the value of one of them (e.g., X) by pairing it with a US (e.g., shock) is reflected in how animals respond to the other (A; Rizley & Rescorla, 1972; see also, e.g., Brogden, 1939; Rescorla, 1980) . This phenomenon is often taken to reflect that (a) the first stage of training results in the formation of an A ---* X association, (b) during the second stage an X ---* shock association forms, and (c) subsequently, the presentation of A elicits suppression because A activates the associative chain A ---, X --. shock. Like an acquired equivalencedistinctiveness procedure, a sensory-preconditioning procedure is of potential use in determining the associative structures that form during biconditional discrimination training. In essence, if biconditional training enables a stimulus, A, to activate a specific association (X ---* food), then revaluing that association should be reflected in how animals subsequently respond to A. This experimental strategy was used in Experiment 2. Experiment 1 Table 1 contains a summary of the design of Experiment 1. In the first stage of training, hungry rats received biconditional discrimination training. Rats received separate presentations of four auditory stimuli (A, B, C, and D). Half of the presentations of each auditory stimulus were immediately followed by one visual stimulus, X, and the remainder by a second visual stimulus, Y. Half of these serial compounds (A-X, B-X, C-Y, and D-Y) were immediately followed by the delivery of food, whereas the remaining compounds (A-Y, B-Y, C-X, and D-X) were not followed by food. We assumed that animals would acquire this discrimination, coming to respond more vigorously during the second elements (X and Y) on reinforced trials than on nonreinforced trials. During the second, revaluation stage, A was paired with electric shock and C was not. Subsequently, we assessed the capacity for each of the stimuli (A, B, C, D, X, and Y) to suppress ongoing instrumental responding for food. In the critical first test, the extent to which B and D elicited generalized conditioned suppression was measured. The second test was included to assess whether the revalua- Table 1 Design of Experiment 1 tion procedure resulted in differential suppression to X and Y (see Discussion of Experiment 1), and the final test was simply intended to establish the success of the revaluation procedure with A and C. Application of configural and conditional (or occasion-setting) accounts to biconditional discrimination training, our revaluation stage, and the critical first test is relatively straightforward and is presented next. According to configural accounts, biconditional training will result in the formation of two sorts of association. First, configural representations of the stimuli presented on reinforced trials (AX, BX, CY, and DY) become associated with the representation of food. Second, configural representations of the stimuli presented on nonreinforced trials (AY, BY, CX, and DX) become linked to a representation of the absence of food. Of course, during the serial compounds that we used here, there is no basis on which rats could respond appropriately until the second elements (X and Y) of the compounds are presented; the first elements of the compounds (e.g., A) are equally capable of (partially) activating configural units associated with food (AX) or no food (AY). However, once the second element of a compound (e.g., X) is presented, this will cause one of the configural representations to become fully active (AX in this example) and allow the animal to perform appropriately. This account, however, provides no grounds for anticipating that the revaluation treatment, in which A is paired with shock and C is paired with no shock, will result in any difference in generalized conditioned suppression to B and D. Thus, during the revaluation stage, the presentation of A might provoke activity in configural representations to which it is similar (AX and AY). However, these representations are equally similar to configural representations involving B (BX and BY) as to those involving D (DX and DY). Therefore, B and D should be equally likely to activate a representation of shock, and there should be no difference in the capacity of B and D to elicit generalized conditioned suppression.
According to the alternative, conditional (or occasionsetting) accounts, biconditional training will result in the first elements of the compounds (A, B, C, and D) coming to activate specific associations: the presentation of either A or B activates or "primes" one pair of associations (the X ---, food and Y ---* no food associations), and the presentation of either C or D primes a different pair of associations (the X ~ no food and Y---* food associations). Again, during the first elements of the compounds, there is no basis on which an animal can respond appropriately. However, on presentation of the second element, appropriate performance can be generated. For example, if X is presented after A, then the X ---* food association that has been primed by A (rather than the unprimed X ~ no food association) will determine performance. The notion that A and B activate one pair of associations (X ---* food and Y ---* no food) whereas C and D activate a different pair of associations (X ---. no food and Y ---, food) allows that the conditioned suppression acquired by A will generalize differentially to B and D. For example, during the revaluation stage, A will evoke the X --, food and Y ---* no food associations, and these evoked associations will be paired with the delivery of shock. Subsequently, the presentation of B, but not of D, will be capable of evoking those associations evoked when A was paired with shock. Unlike the configural accounts considered above which predict no difference in the extent of generalized conditioned suppression to B and D, conditional accounts predict that B should be more likely to elicit generalized conditioned suppression than D. Experiment 1 tested these two predictions.
Method
Subjects. Sixteen male hooded Lister rats supplied by the central animal unit at the University of Wales, Cardiff, served as subjects. They were maintained at 80% of their free-feeding weights (mean: 489 g) by controlled administration of food (Teklad laboratory diet) at the end of each day. The colony room, where the rats were housed in pairs, was illuminated between 8.00 a.m. and 8.00 p.m. Training began at 9.00 a.m.
Apparatus. Training and testing were conducted in four standard, operant chambers (20 cm high and 24 cm in depth and width; Campden Instruments Ltd., Manchester, UK) that were housed in sound-and light-resistant cabinets. A speaker mounted on the outside of the chambers was used to present auditory stimuli. Each chamber was equipped with a food well to which 45-mg food pellets could be delivered. This food well could be illuminated by a 24-V light bulb immediately above and inside the food well. A transparent plastic flap, 6 cm high × 5 cm wide, hinged along the uppermost edge of the opening to the food well, guarded access to the food well. A flap movement of approximately 2 mm was automatically recorded as a single response or magazine entry. The floor of the chamber was made from stainless steel rods (with diameters of 5 mm and mounted 1.5 cm apart) that could be electrified by a Campden Instruments Ltd. shock source with scrambler (Campden Instruments Ltd. models 521C and 521S, respectively). Four auditory CSs and two visual CSs were used. All CSs were 10 s. The auditory stimuli were a 10-Hz train of clicks, a 2000-Hz constant tone, and a 3000-Hz pulsed tone (produced by alternating periods of 300 ms in which the tone was presented and 200 ms in which the tone was absent) and white noise. The first three of these stimuli were generated by two audio generators (one was the source of the clicker and the second produced the tones; Campden Instruments Ltd. model no. 258). The white noise was produced by a Campden Instruments Ltd. white noise generator (model no. 530). These stimuli were presented at an intensity of 75 dB (A weighting). The constant operation of the 24-V light bulb above the food tray served as one of the visual stimuli, and the flashing illumination of the same light bulb (alternating periods of 300 ms in which the light was on and 200 ms in which it was off) served as the remaining visual stimulus. A BBC Master computer with a Spider extension (Paul Fray Ltd., UK) controlled the apparatus and recorded magazine entries.
Procedure
Magazine training. Rats were trained to retrieve food pellets from the food well on the first 2 days of the experiment. On the first day, the plastic flaps in front of the food tray were fixed in a raised position to allow the rats unimpeded access to the food pellets. On the second day, these flaps were lowered, and rats had to push them to gain access to the food tray. On both days, 30 USs were delivered on a variable time (VT) 60-s schedule. One rat failed to collect food pellets from the food tray, and its participation in the experiment was, therefore, terminated. The boxes were in darkness during magazine training and during all subsequent stages of training with the obvious exception of when visual stimuli were presented.
Biconditional training. On each of 48 days, rats received a single session of biconditional discrimination training (see Table  1 ). There were five trials of each of the eight trial types within each session. The trials were delivered according to a VT 120-s schedule. To ensure that the distribution of the different trial types within each session was relatively even, the session was divided into five blocks of eight trials. Within every block of trials, each of the eight trial types was presented once. The order in which the different trial types were presented was, in other respects, random. Each trial consisted of an auditory stimulus (A, B, C, or D) that was immediately followed by a visual stimulus (X or Y). The constant tone and the pulsed tone served as A and C, whereas the white noise and clicker served as B and D. The identity of the stimulus serving as A or C and the identity of the stimulus serving as B or D was fully counterbalanced. The identity of the visual stimulus, constant or flashing light, that served as X and Y was also fully counterbalanced. Serial compounds A-X, B-X, C-Y, and D-Y were immediately followed by the delivery of a single food pellet, whereas the remaining serial compounds, A-Y, B-Y, C-X, and D-X were not. During biconditional training, learning was assessed by comparing the total number of magazine entries during X and Y on reinforced trials with the number of such entries on nonreinforced trials. Before the revaluation stage, it was important to establish that the critical test stimuli, B and D, did not elicit different levels of responding. On the final day of biconditional discrimination training, the total number of responses during B (with a mean of 11.85) did not differ from the number of responses during D (with a mean of 10.35); analysis of variance (ANOVA) confirmed that responding during B and D did not differ (F < 1).
Revaluation. During the next two sessions, rats received a simple discrimination: Presentations of A were immediately followed by the delivery of a 0.5-s 0.5-mA electric shock, whereas those of C were not followed by shock. There were three presentations of A and three presentations of C in each session. These trials were presented in a counterbalanced sequence. Thus, half of the rats received the sequence ACCACA on the first day and were given the sequence CAACAC on the second day, whereas the remaining rats received these sequences in the reverse order. The first trial was presented 10 min after rats had been placed in the chambers, and there was a 5-min interval between successive trials.
Instrumental baseline training. Over the next 3 days, pushing the transparent flap was trained as an instrumental response. On the first day, each entry was followed by a single food pellet, and on the next 2 days flap entries were reinforced according to a randominterval (RI) 60-s schedule. On each day the rats were removed from the chamber after they had earned 30 food pellets.
Test sessions. The rats finally received three test sessions in which the extent to which B and D (Test I), X and Y (Test 2), and A and C (Test 3) disrupted instrumental responding for food (maintained on an RI 60-s schedule) was measured. The sequencing of stimulus presentations within each test session was the same as during aversive conditioning, except that no shocks were presented. Thus, there were three presentations of each of the two stimuli (B and D, X and Y, or A and C) within each test session that were presented in a counterbalanced order (e.g., BDDBDB for half of the rats and DBBDBD for the remainder). The specific order in which rats received test trials (B or D, X or Y, and A or C) was also counterbalanced with respect to the order in which A and C had been presented during the revaluation stage. The RI 60-s schedule was in force in each session, but was suspended in the 30-s periods preceding and after each trial to reduce the likelihood of the stimuli being paired with food during the tests. The impact of the stimuli on instrumental baseline responding was expressed as a conventional suppression ratio: the rate of responding during the target stimulus (10 s) divided by the rate of responding during the target stimulus plus the rate of responding during the 10-s period immediately before the stimulus, the prestimulus period. Using this ratio, scores below 0.50 denote that rats have responded less in the presence of the stimulus than in the immediately preceding stimulus-free period.
The rejection level adopted for all analyses was p < .05. Table 2 presents the scores for the six, eight-session blocks of biconditional training. The scores are collapsed across the particular stimuli that served as A, B, C, and D and as X and Y, because these counterbalanced factors had no effect on the pattern of results that we observed. Inspection of Table 1 reveals that during the early stages of training there was little difference in the number of magazine entries during X and Y on reinforced and nonreinforced trials. However, by the final blocks of training, responding was more vigorous during X and Y on reinforced trials than on nonreinforced trials. ANOVA with trial type (reinforced or nonreinforced) and block (one to six) as factors revealed effects of trial type, F(1, 14) = 31.17, and block, F(5, 70) --2.80, and an interaction between these factors, F(5, 70) = 7.65. Analysis of simple main effects revealed a small but reliable difference between the level of responding on reinforced and nonreinforced trials on Block 1 of training, F(1, 14) = 5.09, and marked differences between these trial types on each of the subsequent blocks (smallest F(1, 14) = 15.90); additionally, by the final block of training, all 15 rats responded more vigorously on reinforced trials than on nonreinforced trials. No data were recorded during the revaluation stage. Subsequently, instrumental baseline training was successful in establishing a stable level of magazine entries (see later discussion).
Results
The level of suppression observed in the presence of B and D (Test 1), X and Y (Test 2), and A and C (Test 3) are presented in the upper, middle, and lower panels of Figure 1 , respectively. Inspection of the upper panel reveals that any suppression of responding is largely confined to the first trial on which B and D were presented and is restricted to stimulus B in particular, a pattern of results reminiscent of that reported in Honey and Hall (1989) . An ANOVA conducted on the suppression scores from the first pair of trials confirmed this description of the results, F(1, 14) = 6.49. Inspection of the middle panel of Figure 1 reveals that any suppression in the presence of X and Y was confined to the initial presentations of these stimuli and that suppression was similar to both cues. Statistical analysis confirms the impression that the level of suppression on initial trials was similar in the presence of X and Y (F < 1). Finally, the lower panel of Figure 1 shows that the stimulus paired with shock, A, elicited more marked suppression than the stimulus that was not, C, an effect that was maintained throughout testing. An ANOVA conducted on the first pair of trials confirmed that the levels of suppression elicited by A and C differed, F (I, 14) --- 
Discussion
The results of Experiment 1 are analogous to demonstrations of the acquired equivalence and distinctiveness of cues (see Honey and Hall, 1989; . In their study, the generalization of conditioned suppression from one stimulus to another was more marked when both had signaled food than when one signaled food and the other signaled the absence of food. In Experiment 1, however, the acquired changes in stimulus discriminability appear to have been brought about in a more complex and interesting manner. In Experiment 1, each of the critical stimuli (A, B, C, and D) had been paired equally often with X and Y and with food and no food. However, whereas A and B had preceded the same pair of relationships or associations (X ~ food and Y ~ no food), C and D preceded a second pair of associations (X ~ no food and Y ---* food). Subsequently, generalization of suppression between A and B was more marked than between A and D. These results suggest the existence of a process of acquired relational equivalence in which stimuli become equivalent as the result of predicting the same relationships or associations. One implication of this suggestion is that an animal's capacity to acquire the initial biconditional discrimination is a product of the ability of A, B, C, and D to activate these associations (Holland, 1983 ; see also Bonardi, 1989; Bouton, 1991; Honey & Hail, 1989; Rescorla, 1991) . Before accepting this implication and the putative process on which it rests, we should consider an alternative, simpler interpretation of the results of Experiment 1.
We have assumed that the binary associations between each of the auditory stimuli (A, B, C, and D) and the events Note. The mean scores represent the total number of responses during the second elements of the serial compounds (X and Y; see Table 1 ) on reinforced (+) and nonreinforced (-) trials across six blocks of training. The scores for each block represent the mean of 8 days of training. lent for each of the auditory stimuli. However, there are some grounds for supporting that this need not be the case when we consider the binary associations between the auditory and visual stimuli. For example, it has been shown that pairing one stimulus, A, with another, X, is less likely to result in the formation of an association between them if this pairing terminates in the delivery of an event of motivational significance (Holland, 1980 ; see also Hall & Honey, 1993) . If this process operated during our biconditional training procedure, then associations between the elements of the compounds followed by food (A-X and B-X, C-Y and D-Y) might be less well formed than those between the elements of the nonreinforced compounds (A-Y, B-Y, C-X, and D-X). Accordingly, the acquired equivalence between A and B might merely reflect that these stimuli share a strong capacity to activate a representation of Y, whereas C and D share the capacity to activate a representation of X. More specifically, under these circumstances, pairing A with shock might allow the associatively evoked representation of Y to become associated with shock. The fact that the representation of Y is associated with shock would then allow B to elicit suppression, because it too can evoke a representation of Y (for an analogous suggestion, see Urcuioli, Zentall, & DeMarse, 1995 ; see also Bonardi & Hall, 1994; Hall, 1996; Honey & Hail, 1991) . This suggestion is directly undermined by the finding that Y was no more likely to elicit suppression than X during Test 2. However, we considered this null result to be an insufficient basis upon which to reject this simple account entirely. Instead, we conducted Experiment 2, which was designed to compare this simple account with that based on the notion of acquired relational equivalence. that follow them (X, Y, food, and no food) are equivalent. This seems reasonable when we consider the associations between the auditory stimuli and food or its absence; the conditions of reinforcement and nonreinforcement are equiva-
Experiment 2
The design of Experiment 2 is summarized in Table 3 and is based on a sensory preconditioning procedure. The first stage of Experiment 2 was identical to that of Experiment 1: Rats received biconditional discrimination training. Subsequently, rats received one of two revaluation treatments. In the positive condition, rats received X ---* food pairings that were followed by shock and Y ---, food pairings that were not. In the negative condition, rats received Y ---* no food pairings that were followed by shock and X ----, no food pairings that were not. After instrumental baseline training, rats were given tests in which the capacity of A, B, C, and D to suppress baseline responding for food was assessed. If the presentation of A or B activates the X ~ food and Y ~ no food associations whereas that of C or D activates the X --. no food and Y ---* food associations, then revaluing either the X ~ food association (positive condition) or the Y ---* no food association (negative condition) should result in A and B eliciting greater suppression than C and D. If, however, biconditional training results in A and B having a stronger association with Y than X, whereas it results in C and D having a stronger association with X than Y, then the revaluation treatments given to rats in the positive and negative conditions should have different consequences: In the positive condition revaluing X should result in C and D eliciting more suppression than A and B, whereas in the Table 3 Design of Experiment 2 
Me~od
Subjects and apparatus. Subjects were 16 male Lister hooded rats with a mean ad lib weight of 427 g. They were supplied, housed, and maintained in the same way as in Experiment 1. The apparatus was that used in Experiment 1.
Procedure. The initial stages of training were identical to those in Experiment 1: After magazine training, rats received 48 days of biconditional discrimination training. Subsequently, half of the rats were assigned to one of two revaluation conditions: positive and negative. Assignment of rats to conditions was determined on the basis of three criteria: First, that rats in each of the various counterbalanced components of biconditional training were equally represented in the two conditions. Second, the two conditions showed an equivalent discrimination between reinforced and nonreinforced presentations of X and Y on the final day of biconditional training. Third, the absolute levels of responding in the presence of the test stimuli, A, B, C, and D, were similar on the final day of training. These criteria were successfully met. Having assigned an equal number of rats from each of the counterbalanced subgroups to the two conditions, positive and negative, we examined their performance on the final day of training. The mean total responses on reinforced and nonreinforced trials for rats in the positive condition were 28.00 and 18.75, respectively, and the corresponding scores for rats in the negative condition were 59.37 and 49.62. ANOVA with trial type and condition as factors revealed an effect of trial type, F(1, 14) = 20.48, no effect of condition, F(1, 14) = 2.64, and no interaction between these factors (F < 1). The difference in the absolute levels of responding between the two conditions largely reflected the performance of 2 rats in the negative group that responded at a high rate. Without these rats' scores, the means for group negative on reinforced and nonreinforced trials were 36.00 and 27.33, respectively. Finally, and critically, the mean total number of responses in the presence of B and D on the final day of discrimination training (B = 8.88 and D = 8.50 for rats in the positive condition and B = 11.62 and D = 10.76 for those in the negative condition) were well matched. ANOVA with stimulus and condition as factors revealed no effect of either factor and no interaction between these factors (Fs < 1). Similarly, the level of responding in the presence of A and C on the final day of discrimination training (A = 8.62 and C = 8.24 for rats in the positive condition and A = 11.12 and C = 12.76 for those in negative condition) were well matched. ANOVA with stimulus and condition as factors revealed no effect of either factor and no interaction between these factors (Fs < 1).
After the final day of biconditional training, rats received 2 days of revaluation training. On each day of revaluation training, rats received three presentations of X and three of Y. For rats in the positive condition, presentations of X were followed immediately by the delivery of food and, after an interval of 10 s, by the delivery of a 0.5-s 0.5-mA shock; presentations of Y were also followed by food but not by shock. For rats in the negative condition, presentations of Y were followed by no food and, after an interval of 10 s, by the delivery of a 0.5-s 0.5-mA shock; presentations of Y were followed by neither food nor shock. This trace conditioning procedure was used in an attempt to ensure that rats received the outcomes that followed X and Y (food or no food) before the delivery of shock. The scheduling and number of stimulus presentations were identical to those in Experiment 1. After instrumental baseline training, rats received two test sessions. In Test 1 rats were given presentations of B and D, and in Test 2 rats received presentations of A and C. The details of these tests (trial order, temporal sequencing, and counterbalancing) were identical to those in the critical tests in Experiment 1, as were other details of Experiment 2 that have not been mentioned. However, in an attempt to attain a more stable level of baseline responding on the test trials, we recorded the rate of responding during the 20-s period before the delivery of the various test stimuli rather than the 10-s periods used in Experiment 1. Table 4 depicts the acquisition of the biconditional discrimination in Experiment 2. The overall levels of responding during X and Y were somewhat lower in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1, an observation that was largely a consequence of 3 animals in Experiment 1 that responded at a high rate. Nevertheless, inspection of Table 4 indicates that, in other respects, the results of Experiment 2 were similar to those of Experiment 1. Thus, during the initial stages of training, there was little difference in the number of magazine entries during X and Y on reinforced and nonreinforced trials; but, by the final blocks of training, responding was more vigorous during X and Y on reinforced trials than on nonreinforced trials. ANOVA with trial type (reinforced or nonreinforced) and block (1-6) as factors revealed effects of trial type, F(1, 15) = 26.08, no effect of block (F < 1), and an interaction between trial type and block, F(5, 75) = 5.17. Analysis of simple main effects revealed no difference in the level of responding on reinforced and nonreinforced trials during the first block of Note. The mean scores represent the total number of responses during the second elements of the serial compounds (X and Y; see Table 1 ) on reinforced (+) and nonreinforced (-) trials across six blocks of training. The scores for each block represent the mean of 8 days of training.
Results
331 training (F < 1), but significant differences between these trial types on each of the subsequent blocks, smallest F(1, 15) = 8.89. By the final block of training, all animals responded more vigorously on reinforced trials than on nonreinforced trials. Again, no data were recorded during the revaluation stage, and instrumental baseline training established a stable level of magazine entries (see later discussion). After the revaluation procedure and the successful acquisition of instrumental baseline responding, rats received test trials with A, B, C, and D. These results are shown in Figure  2 . For ease of presentation, the suppression ratios are collapsed across the two tests. Thus, a ratio for each of the test trials was calculated, and the mean of the first trial with each of, for example, A and B was averaged to produce the first point on each panel in Figure 2 and so on. Inspection of the scores for rats in the positive condition reveals that, on the first and second test trials, A and B elicited more marked suppression than C and D and that by the final trial there was little suppression during any of the stimuli. A similar pattern of results was observed for rats in the negative condition: A and B elicited more substantial suppression than C and D, a difference that was most marked on the second test trial. Although these differences were numerically small, they were highly consistent; 7 of 8 rats in both conditions showed greater suppression to A and B than to C and D. Statistical analysis confirmed the accuracy of this description of the results. ANOVA with stimulus (A and B vs. C and D), condition (positive vs. negative), and trial (1-3) as factors revealed an effect of stimulus, F(1, 14) = 6.13, no effect of condition (F < 1), an effect of trial, F(2, 28) = 9.88, and no significant interactions between these factors (Fs < 1). The response rates during the prestimulus periods in the first test, with means of 37.12 rpm (B) and 33.18 rpm (D), did not differ significantly, F(1, 15) = 2.93. Similarly, the response rates during the prestimulus periods in the second test, with means of 42.31 rpm (A) and 40.25 (C), did not differ significantly, F(1, 15) --1.70.
Discussion
In Experiment 1 rats received a biconditional discrimination in which two stimuli, A and B, preceded one pair of associations (X---. food and Y---, no food), and a second pair of stimuli, C and D, preceded a second pair of associations (X ~ no food and Y ~ food). Subsequently, conditioned suppression established by pairing A with shock was more likely to generalize to B than to D. We argued that this result seemed to denote the operation of a process of acquired relational equivalence: Rats treat two stimuli as similar or equivalent if both stimuli evoke the same relationships or associations. One implication of this suggestion was investigated in Experiment 2. After initial biconditional training, rats received aversive conditioning in which the relationships that A and B had preceded (X-4 food or Y ---* no food) were paired with shock, whereas those that C and D had preceded (Y ~ food or Y ---* no food) were not paired with shock. Subsequently, suppression was more marked to A and B than to C and D. These results lend support to our analysis of the results of Experiment 1 and cannot be explained in terms of an alternative account that relies on the suggestion that biconditional training results in binary associations of differing strengths between the auditory (A, B, C, and D) and visual (X or Y) stimuli (see introduction to Experiment 2).
Like the results of Experiment 1, those of Experiment 2 are difficult to explain in terms of extant configural theories (e.g., Pearce, 1994) . In particular, according to such theories, the capacity for the presentation of A, B, C, or D to elicit generalized suppression after the revaluation stage in Experiment 2 is based on their capacity to activate configural representations that can also be activated by X or Y. Given that each of the configural representations formed during biconditional training (AX, BX, CX, DX and AY, BY, CY, DY) is capable of being activated by X and Y, there are no grounds to suppose that the revaluation procedure used in Experiment 2 will result in greater generalization to A and B than to C and D. This is not to say, however, that elaborated versions of configural theories would be unable to provide an account for our results (see later discussion).
General Discussion
We investigated the associative structures acquired during biconditional discrimination training using two complementary strategies: one based on studies of the acquired equivalence and distinctiveness of cues ; see also Urcuioli et al., 1995) and the second based on studies of sensory preconditioning (Brogden, 1939; Rizley & Rescorla, 1972) . The results of our study provide converging support for the suggestion that, as a result of biconditional discrimination training, stimuli come to evoke a representation of the association that they have preceded (Holland, 1983 ; see also Bonardi, 1989; Bouton, 1991; Rescorla, 1991) . In Experiment 1, generalization of conditioned suppression between two stimuli, A and B, that had preceded the same relationships or associations was more marked than between stimuli, A and D, that had preceded different associations, an acquired relational equivalence effect. In keeping with the spirit of the analysis given for other demonstrations of acquired equivalence (e.g., , we suppose that when A is paired with shock, the associations that A evokes will also be paired with shock, thereby endowing these associations with aversive properties. One consequence of this will be that the other stimulus that can evoke these revalued associations, B, will also be capable of eliciting suppression. The suggestion that whole associations can, in some sense, enter into association with other USs receives direct support from the results of Experiment 2. In this Experiment, as the result of directly pairing one association (e.g., X ---, food) with shock, stimuli that had signaled this association during biconditional training, A and B, also elicited suppression. This effect is directly analogous to demonstrations of sensory preconditioning.
Given that the presentation of a stimulus can come to evoke a memory of a specific association, it is parsimonious to assume that this ability also underlies the capacity to acquire biconditional discriminations. It is now time to consider, in more detail, how this informal view might be instantiated. Here we consider two possibilities: one based on the notion of occasion setting (Holland, 1983) and the other on an extension to configural accounts of learning (e.g., Pearce, 1994 ; see also Rescorla, 1991, p. 21 ).
As we have already noted, the suggestion that conditional discriminations are acquired by one stimulus (e.g., A) gaining hierarchical control over specific associations (e.g., X ~ food) has been made on a number of occasions (Holland, 1983 ; see also Bonardi, 1989; Bouton, 1991; Rescorla, 1991) . Our results provide support for this general suggestion. There have, however, been differences in how this hierarchical function has been described. For example, A might, in some way, gate activity in the link between X and food (Holland, 1983) . Alternatively, others have drawn an analogy between the way a CS activates a US and the way in which, for example, A might have activated the X ---* food association in our experiments; that is, A might activate the entire X ---* food association (the representations of X, food, and the link between them). One way in which these views might be reconciled and elaborated is to make the sort of assumption, commonplace elsewhere (see, e.g., Gluck & Bower, 1988; Sutton & Barto, 1981; Rummelhart, Hinton, & Williams, 1988) , that representations activated by X and food are linked via a third intermediate, or "hidden," unit (see also, Pearce, 1994) . The acquisition of our biconditional discrimination might then simply reflect that A and B, for example, come to excite a unit between representations of X and food. More specifically, after biconditional training, presentation of A and B will excite a hidden unit between X and food rather than one between X and no food, thereby increasing the probability that, when X is presented after A or B, it will excite a representation of food and not a representation of no food. This intermediate representation would effectively serve as a gate (Holland, 1983) , modulating the flow of activation from the representation of X to that of food, and it might also be considered to represent the association itself (Bonardi, 1989; Rescorla, 1991) . Moreover, activation of these hidden units would serve as a basis for the mediation of fear conditioning observed in Experiments 1 and 2.
We have already noted that our new results are not explicable in terms of extant configural theories (e.g., Pearce, 1987 Pearce, , 1994 ; see also Rescorla, 1972) . It is worth briefly noting, however, that the account of our results that has just been outlined corresponds to a "configural" model wherein, other things being equal, separately presented stimulus compounds (e.g., AX and BX) are linked to a common configural unit if they are paired with the same outcome. We now consider a way in which configural theories could be extended that preserves their essence and allows them to account for our new results. Pearce (1994) assumed that when two stimuli, A and X, are presented together they activate independent units, A and X, that provide the inputs to a configural unit, AX, which represents their combination. When presentations of A and X are paired with food, this will result in the formation of a link between the configural representation, AX, and a representation of food. As we have already argued, although Pearce's (1994) model provides an account for a broad range of findings, it fails to provide an account for the results of Experiments 1 and 2. However, an explanation of these results can be developed that preserves the spirit of configural theorizing within the framework provided by Pearce's model. For example, Rescorla (1991, p. 21) briefly considered the suggestion that animals might engage in a form of learning that is inherently triadic, representing what appears to be hierarchical information with a single representation. In our experiments, three sources of stimulation are presented on each trial: auditory (A, B, C, or D), visual (X or Y), and motivational (food and no food). One could argue that on each trial, a configural representation is formed that encodes the auditory stimulus, the visual stimulus, and some component (sensory or emotive) of the event of motivational significance. For example, on trials on which A, X, and food are presented, the configural representation, AXf, might form and become linked to a representation of food or a response-generating mechanism activated by the presentation of food. In contrast, on trials on which A, Y, and no food are presented, the configural representation, AYnf, might form and be linked to a representation of no food or a response-generating mechanism activated by the absence of food. Once the outcome of a given trial also forms part of the configural representation of that trial, our new results can be explained without difficulty. According to this account, following biconditional training, generalization between A and B will be more marked than between A and D because the configural representations activated by A and B (e.g., AXf and BXf) are more similar than those activated by A and D (e.g., AXf and DXnf). The results of Experiment 2 are also explicable within this extended configural theory. For example, during revaluation training, an X ---, food trial will provide a dual input to configural representations involving A and B (e.g., AXf) but only a single input to configural representations involving C and D (e.g., CXnf). This difference might be sufficient to allow AXf to acquire greater aversive properties than CXnf.
The results of our study do not provide us with any clear basis on which to choose between the accounts outlined previously. Our results do, however, represent some of the most direct evidence, to date, suggesting that the development of these more complex accounts is necessary and provide a clear impetus for their further development.
